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FISHER, Circuit Judge.  
Anthony Rowe was charged in a one-count indictment 
with distribution and possession with intent to distribute 1000 
grams of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 
(b)(1)(A).  Rowe conceded that he distributed approximately 
200 grams, so the trial focused on whether he had actually 
distributed 1000 grams or more.  The jury returned a general 
verdict finding Rowe guilty of the offense in the amounts of 
both 1000 grams or more and 100 grams or more. Rowe argues 
that the evidence was insufficient to convict because the 
Government did not prove that he distributed or possessed 
1000 grams of heroin in a single unit, instead relying on 
evidence of multiple smaller distributions and possessions 
during the indictment period. He also challenges his sentence, 
arguing that the District Court relied on information lacking 
sufficient indicia of reliability to determine his offense level.  
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We agree that the evidence was insufficient to support 
the 1000-gram verdict. We will therefore vacate the judgment 
of conviction based on the 1000-gram verdict and remand to 
the District Court to enter a judgment of conviction based on 
the 100-gram verdict. Because this conclusion resolves Rowe’s 
appeal of the judgment, we will not address his additional 
arguments concerning duplicity of the indictment and 
prosecutorial misconduct. Regarding Rowe’s sentence, we will 
vacate and remand for re-sentencing with the instruction that 
the Government may not introduce additional evidence on drug 
quantity.    
I.  
 Investigation, Arrest, and Indictment  
Government witness and confidential informant 
William Pierce was arrested on April 20, 2016 after about ten 
grams of marijuana and forty grams of heroin were discovered 
in the rental car he was driving. Pierce offered to cooperate and 
subsequently made controlled transactions under surveillance. 
On June 25, 2016, Pierce paid Rowe $3900 and received 
198.86 grams of heroin, and on June 27, 2016, Pierce paid him 
$7000 in pre-recorded bills for heroin Pierce had previously 
received. Rowe was arrested shortly afterward. Officers 
recovered a small notebook, several cell phones, and cash that 
matched the pre-recorded bills. 
 Rowe was indicted in the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania for one count of distributing and possessing with 
intent to distribute 1000 grams and more of heroin, a Schedule 
I controlled substance, from on or about February 2016 
through on or about June 25, 2016, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). 
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 The Trial  
At trial, Rowe conceded that he had delivered 
approximately 200 grams of heroin to Pierce while under 
surveillance. Due to Rowe’s concession, the only contested 
issue was drug weight; the jury was charged with determining 
whether Rowe distributed or possessed with intent to distribute 
1000 grams or more of heroin, or a lesser amount (100 grams 
or more). The Government’s theory throughout the trial was 
that because Rowe distributed or possessed with intent to 
distribute a total of 1000 grams or more of heroin during the 
indictment period, a 1000-gram verdict was justified. To 
support its theory, the Government presented the testimony of 
Pierce and a Drug Enforcement Administration agent, as well 
as the notebook found when Rowe was arrested.  
1. Testimony of Confidential Informant William 
Pierce  
Pierce’s testimony implicated Rowe in sales totaling as 
much as 1700 grams of heroin during the indictment period. 
Pierce testified that when he met Rowe for the first time in 
February 2016, he attempted to purchase twenty-eight grams 
of heroin, but actually received twenty-one grams (a 
discrepancy that Rowe attributed to unintentional error). 
During this first meeting, Pierce saw a black bag (which he 
described as a “regular . . . little store bag”) in Rowe’s vehicle 
with six to eight packages inside, with numbers on each 
package that read “50 or a hundred or 75.” App. 169a. Pierce 
believed these numbers indicated the amount of drugs in the 
packages. 
In the following months, Pierce testified that he bought 
heroin from Rowe one to two times a week for $75 to $85 per 
gram. Pierce recalled buying twenty-one grams in February 
2016 and fifty grams shortly thereafter. There were larger 
transactions as well: eight purchases of 100 grams and three 
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purchases of 150 to 200 grams. Pierce also testified about the 
two controlled transactions.1 Pierce testified that in all, he 
bought $80,000 to $140,000 worth of heroin from Rowe at 
around $82.50 per gram, which would indicate a total amount 
of 969.7 to 1697 grams.  
Pierce testified that Rowe often wrote in “little 
notebooks.” App. 209a-210a. When presented with the 
notebook confiscated from Rowe upon his arrest, Pierce 
testified that notations on a page marked “DO” tracked his 
purchase and payment history with Rowe, including the 
controlled transactions.  
2. Expert Testimony of DEA Special Agent 
Shuffelbottom  
DEA Special Agent Eric Shuffelbottom, who had 
experience in narcotics, undercover investigations, and 
domestic and international drug smuggling, provided expert 
testimony. He testified that based on his experience, the 
notebook appeared to be a drug ledger, that is, “a record 
keeping of drug transactions and money transactions.” App. 
363a. He testified that the initials at the tops of the pages likely 
referred to customers, and that the numbers below the initials 
likely referred to the amount of product fronted to each 
customer. Special Agent Shuffelbottom further testified that 
additional notations tracked customers’ payments and 
remaining debts. He explained that the notation “275x70” on 
the inside cover of the ledger could refer to a 275-gram 
purchase of a $70-per-gram substance.  
                                              
1 At trial, Pierce seemed to confuse the two controlled 
transactions, providing inconsistent testimony regarding how 
much he paid Rowe on which date. The facts were 
subsequently clarified through additional testimony from 
Pierce and from officers who were involved in the transactions. 
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In addition to testifying about the ledger, Special Agent 
Shuffelbottom testified generally about the heroin trade. For 
example, he testified that one thousand grams of heroin could 
cost between $65,000 and $75,000 and that individual amounts 
of heroin were often packaged in “thin wax paper bags.” App. 
358a. Special Agent Shuffelbottom also testified that a dealer 
selling 200 grams of heroin at a time would likely have access 
to multi-kilogram quantities. Finally, he testified about how 
dealers use cell phones to conduct business and that they often 
transport drugs from larger cities to smaller communities by 
car. 
3. The Ledger  
The Government argued that the notebook was Rowe’s 
drug ledger, pointing to Pierce’s and Special Agent 
Shuffelbottom’s testimony, and also drawing connections 
between Pierce’s testimony, the notations on the “DO” page, 
and the marked funds from the controlled transactions. Over 
defense counsel’s objection, the District Court admitted the 
ledger in its entirety. 
4. Closing Argument  
In closing, the prosecutor argued, based on the evidence 
of multiple distributions, that the Government presented 
sufficient evidence to prove the 1000-gram drug weight.  For 
instance, he tallied the figures in the ledger to arrive at a “drug 
ledger total” of 1066 grams. App. 405a. He argued that Pierce’s 
testimony and his corresponding page in the ledger indicated 
that the notations in the ledger referred to heroin.  
5. The Instructions, Verdict, and Post-Trial Motion  
The District Court instructed the jury that it had to 
decide “whether the Government has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Mr. Rowe distributed 1 kilogram or more 
of heroin.” App. 452a. The jury also had the option of returning 
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a verdict for the lesser-included 100 grams. It returned a guilty 
verdict for both drug weights.  
Rowe filed a post-trial motion for a judgment of 
acquittal or a new trial, arguing that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the jury’s 1000-gram verdict, 
particularly because the District Court did not instruct the jury 
on how to “determine the particular weight of heroin that was 
involved in the crime.” App. 496a. The District Court denied 
the motion.  
 Sentencing  
Rowe objected to the Presentence Report (PSR) 
calculation that his offense involved at least ten kilograms of 
heroin, resulting in a base offense level of thirty-four under 
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3). The PSR determination was based on 
a statement Rowe was alleged to have made at the time of his 
arrest regarding his heroin supplier. However, evidence of that 
statement had been excluded at trial, and the Government 
neither called a witness nor introduced any documentary 
evidence concerning the statement at sentencing. Rowe 
therefore argued that the Government had not presented any 
evidence that his offense involved the requisite ten kilograms 
of heroin. Despite Rowe’s objection, the Court “adopt[ed] the 
pre-sentence investigation report without change,” App. 549a, 
and imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of 151 months’ 
imprisonment followed by five years’ supervised release. 
II.2 
 Insufficient Evidence to Support the 1000-Gram Verdict   
 Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is plenary, 
but “we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable 
                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 
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to the government and affirm the judgment if there is 
substantial evidence from which any rational trier of fact could 
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. 
Benjamin, 711 F.3d 371, 376 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Our task therefore is to 
determine “whether the Government has adduced sufficient 
evidence respecting each element of the offense charged to 
permit jury consideration.” United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 
54, 63 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).  
The Government may rely on direct and circumstantial 
evidence to make its case to the jury. United States v. 
Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 425 (3d Cir. 2013). While 
it is axiomatic that reasonable inferences can support a verdict, 
they “must bear a logical or convincing connection to 
established fact.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). In the end, “[t]he question is whether all the pieces of 
evidence against the defendant, taken together, make a strong 
enough case to let a jury find [the defendant] guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” Id. at 432 (quoting United States v. Cooper, 
567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir. 1977)).  
The Government charged Rowe with violating 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) by two means: distributing heroin, and 
possessing it with intent to distribute. The Government further 
charged that the violation involved 1000 grams or more of 
heroin, but provided the jury with two options for a finding on 
drug weight: 1000 grams or more, and 100 grams or more. 
Under § 841(b)(1)(A)(i), a violation of § 841(a) involving 
1000 grams or more of heroin requires a mandatory minimum 
penalty of ten years’ imprisonment and sets a maximum 
penalty of life imprisonment. Under § 841(b)(1)(B)(i), a 
violation of § 841(a) involving 100 grams or more of heroin 
                                              
U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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requires a mandatory minimum penalty of five years’ 
imprisonment and sets a maximum penalty of forty years’ 
imprisonment. Because the weight involved in a violation of 
§ 841(a) increases the statutory penalty, it is an element of the 
offense that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013) (“Any fact 
that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ 
that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”). Therefore, the question presented here is 
whether the evidence was sufficient to allow a jury to find that 
Rowe violated § 841(a) by distributing 1000 or more grams of 
heroin, or by possessing with intent to distribute 1000 or more 
grams of heroin. 
Under 21 U.S.C. § 802(11), distribution occurs when a 
controlled substance is delivered. Delivery is “the actual, 
constructive, or attempted transfer of a controlled substance.” 
21 U.S.C. § 802(8). Our sister circuits have held that “[t]he 
plain language of [§ 841(a)] indicates” that “each unlawful 
transfer [is] a distinct offense.” United States v. Lartey, 716 
F.2d 955, 967 (2d Cir. 1983). See United States v. Mancuso, 
718 F.3d 780, 793 (9th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. 
Elliott, 849 F.2d 886, 889 (4th Cir. 1988) (“The more precise 
terms ‘deliver’ and ‘transfer’ suggest that Congress intended 
the statute to criminalize individual acts, rather than a 
continuous course of conduct.”). We agree with their reasoning 
and hold that “separate acts of distribution of controlled 
substances are distinct offenses under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), as 
opposed to a continuing crime.” Mancuso, 718 F.3d at 793.3 
                                              
3 The Eleventh Circuit has held that distribution 
continued where a defendant “performed acts in furtherance of 
[a] sale” in two districts, physically transferring a controlled 
substance in one and receiving payment in another, for the 
 
10 
At trial, the Government did not present evidence of a 
single distribution involving 1000 grams or more of heroin. 
The prosecutor mistakenly believed that distribution of 1000 
grams could be proven by combining several distributions that, 
in total, involved 1000 grams of heroin. Rowe challenged this 
approach in his post-trial motion. The District Court confirmed 
that the Government was mistaken, and the Government 
concedes the same before this Court.4 However, the District 
Court found that because Rowe was also charged with 
possession with intent to distribute, a continuing offense, the 
jury’s general verdict could stand. We disagree. As we will 
now explain, the Government’s understanding of possession 
with intent to distribute was also flawed, and the Government 
did not present sufficient evidence of possession with intent to 
distribute 1000 grams of heroin.   
Possession with intent to distribute is actual or 
constructive possession over a controlled substance, United 
States v. Crippen, 459 F.2d 1387, 1388 (3d Cir. 1972) (per 
curiam), by a defendant who “ha[s] in mind or plan[s] in some 
                                              
purpose of establishing venue in either district. United States 
v. Brunty, 701 F.2d 1375, 1381 (11th Cir. 1983). See United 
States v. Tingle, 183 F.3d 719, 727 (7th Cir. 1999) (distribution 
may continue for venue purposes). However, that analysis does 
not contradict our conclusion that separate acts of distribution 
may not be combined and prosecuted as “part of a single 
continuing scheme” under § 841. Mancuso, 718 F.3d at 793.    
4 “[T]he United States does not dispute that each time 
that Rowe distributed heroin to a customer it constituted a 
separate and discrete crime.” Br. of Appellee at 17. “The 
United States also concedes that it did not admit evidence of 
any single transaction Rowe engaged in during which he 
distributed 1000 grams or more of heroin.” Id. at 18.  
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way” to “deliver or transfer possession or control” of the 
controlled substance to another. Third Circuit Model Criminal 
Jury Instruction § 6.21.841-5. Constructive possession 
requires “the power and the intention at a given time to 
exercise dominion or control over a thing.” Benjamin, 711 F.3d 
at 376 (quoting United States v. Garth, 188 F.3d 99, 112 (3d 
Cir. 1999)). Proof that a defendant associated with a person 
who controls a drug is insufficient to prove constructive 
possession. Garth, 188 F.3d at 112.  
Unlike distribution, possession with intent to distribute 
is a continuing offense. United States v. Zidell, 323 F.3d 412, 
422 (6th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases).5 “A continuing offense 
is a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a 
single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, 
however long a time it may occupy.” United States v. Midstate 
Horticultural Co., 306 U.S. 161, 166 (1939) (citation omitted). 
In Benjamin, we looked at another possession statute—felon in 
possession of a firearm—and held that continuity is interrupted 
by “relinquishment of both actual and constructive possession 
of the gun before it is reacquired.” 711 F.3d at 378 (citation 
and alteration omitted). Applying our reasoning in Benjamin to 
§ 841, we conclude that possession of 1000 grams of heroin 
begins when a defendant has the power and intention to 
exercise dominion and control over all 1000 grams, and ends 
when his possession is interrupted by a complete dispossession 
or by a reduction of that quantity to less than 1000 grams. 
                                              
5 See United States v. Uribe, 890 F.2d 554, 559 (1st Cir. 
1989); United States v. Baskin, 886 F.2d 383, 388 (D.C. Cir. 
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089 (1990); United States v. 
Stitzer, 785 F.2d 1506, 1519 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 
U.S. 823 (1986). 
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The Government’s evidence supporting the 1000-gram 
verdict was premised on its incorrect belief that it could 
combine weights from multiple distributions and 
discontinuous possessions during the indictment period. The 
Government acknowledged its error at oral argument, Oral 
Arg. at 18:32, but asserted that even so, it had presented 
sufficient evidence to support a reasonable inference that at 
some point during the indictment period, Rowe possessed at 
least 1000 grams of heroin with intent to distribute. We are 
unconvinced. If we assume that the jury did not combine the 
amounts distributed or possessed over time, and instead sought 
to determine whether Rowe possessed a 1000-gram quantity of 
heroin at least once during the indictment period, the 
Government’s evidence was not sufficient to permit any 
rational juror to make such a finding beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
From Pierce’s testimony about his first encounter with 
Rowe, a rational juror could have inferred that: (1) there were 
up to eight packages in Rowe’s black bag; (2) each package 
contained up to 100 grams of a substance; and (3) based on the 
confusion between the twenty-eight gram and twenty-one gram 
packages, two or more packages contained heroin. Assuming, 
based on Pierce’s testimony about the markings on the bags, 
that at least one bag was marked “50,” one was marked “75,” 
every other bag was marked “100,” and adding that to the 
twenty-one grams Rowe possessed before distributing that 
package to Pierce, a rational juror could conclude that Rowe 
possessed and intended to distribute 746 grams of heroin. No 
rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt, 
based on this testimony, that Rowe possessed 1000 grams or 
more of heroin at that time.  
Nor did Special Agent Shuffelbottom’s expert 
testimony fill the evidentiary gap. Special Agent 
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Shuffelbottom opined that a dealer who could sell 200 grams 
of heroin at a time (as the evidence showed Rowe did) would 
have access to multi-kilogram quantities. However, testimony 
about the amount of heroin that dealers generally would be able 
to access is insufficient to support a finding that Rowe had 
constructive possession of 1000 grams of heroin at any 
particular time. This evidence might be a basis for speculation, 
but it is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The ledger corroborated Pierce and Special Agent 
Shuffelbottom’s testimony, but failed to provide the necessary 
logical step between Rowe’s discrete distributions and 
possessions and an instance of possession of 1000 grams of 
heroin. The Government’s theory was that all of the notations 
in the ledger referred to heroin Rowe distributed during the 
indictment period. Yet, despite its obvious evidentiary value, 
the ledger lacked dates. Without details about the timing of 
transactions, a rational juror would only have been able to 
speculate about whether Rowe possessed a quantity of at least 
1000 grams at one time during the indictment period.  
All of the evidence—including Pierce’s testimony, 
Special Agent Shuffelbottom’s testimony, and the ledger—
was insufficient, even considered in the light most favorable to 
the Government, to allow a rational juror to find that Rowe 
possessed at least 1000 grams of heroin at a single time with 
the intent to distribute it. We will therefore vacate the 
conviction as to the 1000 grams of heroin.  
We further note that where, as here, the Government’s 
presentation of the evidence rested upon an incorrect 
understanding of the offense, the District Court failed to 
correct the error by instruction, and the general verdict does not 
assist this Court in understanding how the jury arrived at its 
determination, we are reluctant to proceed as though the jury 
was not misled. See Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 431. 
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Deference to jury verdicts is premised on an expectation that 
jurors “are instructed extensively as to what evidence they can 
consider, how to consider it, and . . . the relevant legal 
principles.” Id. That did not happen here, and the logic of 
Caraballo-Rodriguez provides additional support for our 
decision to vacate.6   
                                              
6 Rowe offers two additional arguments to challenge his 
conviction: that the indictment was duplicitous, and that the 
prosecutor committed misconduct in his closing argument. We 
will not address these arguments as they relate to the 1000-
gram verdict, because we have already decided to strike that 
verdict as unsupported by sufficient evidence. Nor do these 
arguments jeopardize the 100-gram verdict. In requesting a 
remedy, Rowe argues: “[a]t least, the degree of the conviction 
must be reduced based on the jury’s alternative, 100-gram 
verdict . . . although there is no clear basis to infer that the jury 
was in fact unanimous as to any occasion with respect to that 
theory either.” Br. of Appellant at 29. While that request does 
not explicitly acknowledge that the 100-gram verdict would 
survive the duplicity argument, at oral argument Rowe 
conceded that the jury agreed on the 100-gram verdict:  
 
Chief Judge Smith:  But we do know, 
though, that the 
jury agreed with 
respect to the 
100-gram 
conviction, 
right?  
Mr. Goldberger:   That’s true. 
 
Oral Arg. at 11:54.  
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 Sentencing Error  
Rowe challenges the District Court’s acceptance of the 
drug weight calculation in the PSR. The Government agrees 
that the District Court erred in adopting that calculation.7 
Having reviewed the District Court’s sentencing 
determination, we also conclude that the court abused its 
discretion by basing its determination on unsupported drug 
weight assertions.8 Therefore, we will vacate the sentence. 
                                              
Furthermore, Rowe’s argument that the prosecutor 
erred in encouraging the jury to combine the figures in the 
ledger as if they all tracked heroin distributions only affects the 
jury’s 1000-gram finding. At the beginning of the trial, Rowe 
referred to the fact that he had distributed at least 100 grams of 
heroin as “undisputed.” App. 133a. Even if we employed our 
usual harmless error standard, we would find that the jury 
could have returned a guilty verdict for distributing at least 100 
grams of heroin “notwithstanding the asserted error.” United 
States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting 
United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506 (1983)). And in 
this case, our review would be even more deferential because 
Rowe did not object to the prosecutor’s closing argument. See 
United States v. Fulton, 837 F.3d 281, 306-07 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(employing plain error review when appellant had not objected 
to prosecutor’s statements at trial).  
7 The Government acknowledges—with commendable 
candor—that “[u]pon thorough review of the record, the 
United States agrees that the 10+ kilogram calculation is 
problematic and that the district court did not address the basis 
for its acceptance of that amount in enough detail.” Br. of 
Appellee at 38. See Oral Arg. at 18:04. 
8 In calculating the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range, a 
district court may consider “largely unlimited” sources of 
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What remains is the parties’ dispute about whether, on remand, 
the Government should be permitted to develop the record on 
the drug weight issue.  
At sentencing, “the government bears the burden of 
proof by a preponderance of the evidence,” United States v. 
Brothers, 75 F.3d 845, 848 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted), 
and ordinarily is only afforded one opportunity to carry its 
burden. United States v. Dickler, 64 F.3d 818, 832 (3d Cir. 
1995). We have recognized a limited exception to our distaste 
for “a second bite at the apple,” id. (quoting United States v. 
Leonzo, 50 F.3d 1086, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1995)), when the 
Government “has tendered a persuasive reason why fairness . . 
. requires” that the sentencing court “provid[e] the government 
with an additional opportunity to present evidence on remand.” 
Id. In Dickler, we imagined such an exception would apply 
where “the government, for want of notice or any other reason 
                                              
evidence, United States v. Paulino, 996 F.2d 1541, 1547 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (citation omitted), but must base its determination 
on information that “ha[s] sufficient indicia of reliability to 
support its probable accuracy.” United States v. Freeman, 763 
F.3d 322, 337 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); U.S.S.G. 
§ 6A1.3(a). Conclusory assertions regarding drug weight in a 
PSR will not support a sentencing court’s determination of 
quantity for the purposes of fixing a Guidelines range. See 
Freeman, 763 F.3d at 337 (citing United States v. Shacklett, 
921 F.2d 580, 584 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (requiring a 
sentence to be vacated because the sentencing court relied on 
the probation officer’s “conclusory statement” regarding drug 
quantity)). Here, the District Court erred in relying on Rowe’s 
alleged admission that he received large quantities of heroin 
from his supplier despite the fact that the Government did not 
present any evidence of such a statement.  
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beyond its control, does not have a fair opportunity to fully 
counter the defendant's evidence.” Id.  
At oral argument, the Government conceded that 
Dickler stands for the proposition that the Government should 
not generally receive a second opportunity to present evidence 
for sentencing absent a persuasive reason, but was unable to 
offer one. Oral Arg. at 28:58. We do not perceive any such 
reason, and therefore the Government will not be permitted to 
introduce additional evidence regarding drug quantity. It may 
argue for any sentence supported by the existing record.  
III. 
 For the reasons explained above, we will vacate the 
judgment of conviction for distribution and possession with 
intent to distribute 1000 grams or more of heroin, and we will 
remand to the District Court for entry by the Court of a 
judgment of conviction for distribution and possession with 
intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin. We will also 
vacate the sentence and remand for re-sentencing. Upon re-
sentencing, the Government may not introduce new evidence 
to prove drug quantity. 
